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operations, it is time to explore the benefits of building a fortified air base of operations within a limited-access country vice the status quo philosophy of long-range air operations from distant, secure bases. Current United States Air Force philosophy bases Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and aerial refueling assets at locations far from the Area of Operations due to force protection concerns. This paper explores the operational and strategic benefits of early commitment to building a fortified air base with appropriate force protection measures for flight operations to eliminate the billions of dollars in wasted transit costs, reduce fatigue on aging aircraft, decrease over-extension of aircrew, reduce opportunities for attacks on deployed forces, build partner capacity and show US resolve towards the security of the host nation.
AIR FORCE PHILOSOPHY SHIFT -FORTIFIED AIRFIELDS IN LIMITED-ACCESS NATIONS
Modern warfare is a war for air bases; the bulldozer must accompany the plane.... One of the elements of victory in North Africa was the speed with which our aviation engineers constructed airfields behind the front lines and pressed the attack.
-General Hap Arnold History has shown that the US has not engaged in any theater air campaigns lasting less than three years in duration. Theater air campaigns in Vietnam, Southwest
Asia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are all examples of air campaigns where the US and coalition forces engaged in long-term air operations. In all of these examples, theater air campaigns began well before and long after ground operations, so the duration is not just limited to major combat operations. Due to the lack of defensive countermeasure equipment and the need to protect Low Density-High Demand (LD-HD) assets, standard United States Air Force (USAF) philosophy currently bases US Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and aerial refueling (AR) assets at locations conducive to providing the necessary force protection measures for these LD-HD assets. When US forces are faced with air operations within a limited-access country such as Afghanistan, operations are based at locations far from the Area of Operations (AO) due to force protection concerns. This concept of operations is extremely inefficient due to the long distances to and from the actual combat operations area. If the US would commit early to building a fortified AB within the limited-access nation, the long-term savings and strategic benefits would pay for the initial construction investment within two years, as will be discussed later.
Throughout this discussion, the air operations in Afghanistan will serve as the example of a limited-access nation where this philosophy shift would have proven feasible. This philosophy shift would also be feasible for any limited-access nation in Central Africa. Additionally, it is prudent to define the term "limited-access." A "limitedaccess" nation is one where access to the nation is limited by geography and operations require permission from adjacent nations for transit from the international commons.
The discussion will begin by identifying the conditions that must exist before building the fortified AB. It will look at the willingness of the host nation to accept the capacity building efforts, the willingness of the host nation to share force protection requirements, ensuring the logistics capability of the host nation to fuel operations, and making certain the coalition secures complete air superiority. After setting the necessary conditions, the discussion will shift to exploring the operational benefits in the areas of drastically cutting the billions of dollars wasted in transit costs, reducing fatigue on aging US aircraft, decreasing the over-extension of the aircrews, reducing the opportunities for attacks on deployed forces, and increasing the responsiveness for alert aircraft to eliminate the requirement for an airborne fuel reserve. Along with these operational benefits, there are multiple strategic benefits of building this fortified AB. These benefits include Building Partner Capacity (BPC) as the security responsibility will eventually transition back to the host nation; sending a strategic message to the host nation
showing US resolve to support the host nation; reducing the diplomatic requirements for overflight and basing rights; and finally, eliminating the vulnerability to the A2-AD efforts of adversaries. After highlighting the conditions and benefits it is important to define the characteristics of the ideal fortified AB. Before making such a dramatic shift in basing philosophy, the discussion will begin with identifying the required conditions to build the fortified AB.
Conditions Necessary to Build
US strategic planners and host nation leadership must meet multiple conditions to ensure this philosophy shift is feasible. First and foremost, the host nation must be willing to accept the BPC efforts of the US and the presence of coalition forces. It is essential that strategic planners conduct a thorough analysis of the current or incoming host nation leadership to assess their willingness and motivations before committing to building the fortified AB. If the analysis indicates a positive relationship and willingness to accept the BPC efforts, strategic planners must then select the correct location that fits the needs of both US operations and host nation leadership. Superiority is "that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, air, and special operations forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force." 7 The only domain not protected by ground FP operations at the fortified AB is an attack from the air. Failure to maintain air superiority not only puts the AB in danger from airborne threats, but also puts the airborne assets in danger.
Freedom to conduct land and naval operations is substantially enhanced when friendly forces are assured that the enemy cannot disrupt operations from above. 8 The ISR and AR assets recommended to relocate forward are LD-HD assets, so any security threat that the integrated FP measures cannot mitigate will jeopardize the relocation of the LD-HD assets. While it is possible to provide protection from air attacks by using Air
Defense systems such as the Patriot missile system; without air superiority, this AB filled with LD-HD assets becomes a tempting target for an enemy willing to take high risks to attack it from the air. By ensuring air superiority, this eliminates the possibility and temptation of the enemy's air forces to attack this valuable target. Although there are many conditions necessary to build the fortified AB, the many operational and strategic benefits will offset the cost of making the fortified AB philosophical shift.
Operational Benefits
Strategic planners must find more efficient and effective methods to conduct military operations. Building the fortified AB in the host nation will provide operational benefits in the following areas: drastically cutting billions of dollars in wasted transit costs; reducing unnecessary fatigue on aging US aircraft; decreasing the needless over-extension of the aircrew population and accompanying effects on force readiness; reducing the opportunities for remote attacks on deployed forces; and increasing responsiveness for alert aircraft to eliminate the need for an airborne fuel reserve.
To meet the BCA directed budget cuts, the US military must find more fiscally efficient methods to conduct increasingly expensive expeditionary warfare. Cutting wasted transit fuel costs associated with long-range air operations is one such method.
Current methodology uses AR to conduct combat operations from distant and easily protected airfields. AR enables refuelable air assets to more rapidly reach any trouble spot around the world with less dependence on forward staging bases or overflight/landing clearances. AR significantly expands the options available to a commander by increasing the range, payload, persistence, and flexibility of receiver aircraft. 9 While USAF doctrine professes that AR reduces the dependence on forward staging bases or overflight/landing clearances, this reduction in dependence on forward staging bases comes with a price. A price that in the past was dismissed as the "cost of doing business", but in today's fiscally constrained environment, this waste can no longer be dismissed by planners. Additionally, the dependence on the staging bases and associated overflight/landing clearance issues are eliminated by operating within the limited-access nation. Moving AR operations to the fortified AB in the host nation will also increase the responsiveness for alert AR aircraft, which will in turn reduce the need for an airborne fuel reserve. During operations, air planners must ensure that in addition to normal AR taskings, the AR force is responsive to the fuel needs for Time Sensitive Targeting   (TST) The alternative to the alert tankers to meet minimum notice fuel requirement is the employment of a planned "airborne reserve." Planners and executors maintained a minimum of 200,000 pounds of airborne fuel reserve at any one time. 16 This method required one or multiple tanker aircraft to fly longer to ensure that fuel was available for any contingency. The closer proximity of the alert tankers reduces or eliminates the need for an "airborne reserve". This would also minimize the unnecessary fatigue on the aging aircraft and the additional hours logged by the aircrews, thus preserving LD-HD assets and reducing the number of aircrews required in theater. While there are many operational benefits for this philosophy shift, there also multiple strategic benefits stemming from building a quality and secure AB in the effected nation.
Strategic Benefits
While it is important to reap the benefits at the operational level, there are also equities to be gained in the strategic realm. Some of the strategic benefits include:
Building Partner Capacity (BPC) as the security responsibility will transition back to the host nation; sending a strategic communication message to the host nation showing US resolve for support to the host nation; reducing the diplomatic requirements for overflight and basing rights; and finally, mitigating the vulnerability to A2-AD efforts by US adversaries.
President Barak Obama stated in his 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) that "We must invest in diplomacy and development capabilities and institutions in a way that complements and reinforces our global partners." 17 Strategic planners must consider this emphasis from the President on the importance of the US connection with current and future partners. As the US conducts BPC operations, one key element is increasing the security capability of the host nation where the US is conducting combat operations. Building this enduring and secure installation can be the cornerstone to building a nation's air capability.
Development is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative. We are focusing on assisting developing countries and their people to manage security threats, reap the benefits of global economic expansion, and set in place accountable and democratic institutions that serve basic human needs. Through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and commensurate resources, we can strengthen the regional partners we need to help us stop conflicts and counter global criminal networks. 18 As previously discussed, US FP forces will work in concert with host nation FP forces to provide integrated FP operations as a necessary condition for building the fortified AB. Planners will also realize the strategic benefits of enhancing the capacity of the host nation FP planners and forces. Joint Doctrine states that "FP is multi- Along with the benefits of building a remote, fortified AB and training the host nation FP forces, moving large-scale air operations into the host nation will infuse large quantities of money into the local economy with the increased logistics support purchased from local businesses. This economic benefit falls in line with the President's guidance on development. As mentioned before, development is not just in the security arena, but also in the diplomatic and economic domains. In addition to the BCP benefits gained, building this fortified AB will also send a strong strategic message demonstrating US commitment to the host nation. Across all of our efforts, effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims. Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout government. We must also be more effective in our deliberate communication and engagement and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of peoples-not just elites-around the world. Doing so allows us to convey credible, consistent messages and to develop effective plans, while better understanding how our actions will be perceived.
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The political message of US investment in the host nation's infrastructure and security forces ensures that the US strategic message about BPC and partnering with the host nation is both credible and consistent.
An additional strategic benefit is reducing the diplomatic requirements for with causing delays to critical air operations. 23 Furthermore, in the event that host nation personnel are killed by these remote attacks, these tactical or operational events will have strategic effects on operations and the theater.
The final strategic benefit to explore is reducing the coalition's vulnerability to the adversary's A2-AD efforts. Despite the high-level interest in anti-access and the term's increasing use in US defense policy documents, no official definition of either "antiaccess" or an "anti-access strategy" exists. 24 Anti-access measures are:
… any action by an opponent that has the effect of slowing the deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing them from operating from certain locations within that theater, or causing them to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than they would normally prefer….Anti-access measures include attacks on airfields, which could force aircraft to operate from more-remote airfields or could prevent additional forces from being flown into the theater; attacks on seaports, which could prevent additional forces from being brought into the theater through these ports; and attacks on aircraft.
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There is no doubt that any enemy capable of denying access to close-range ABs;
preventing aircraft from flying into theater due to a lack of usable ABs; or attacking aircraft in transit to combat operations would certainly do so to disrupt air support for combat ground forces. Moving air operations within the host nation would negate these A2-AD effects. Reacting to an adversary's A2-AD efforts is ineffective compared to eliminating them by building that fortified AB in the limited-access nation.
The Ideal Fortified Air Base in a Limited-Access Nation
After exploring the many fiscal, operational and strategic benefits of the fortified AB philosophy shift, it is practical to shift the discussion to define the characteristics of the model fortified AB. Certainly, it is important to first meet the mandatory conditions of gaining host nation support for presence and FP operations, ensuring regional logistics capabilities and guaranteeing air superiority. Once these conditions are met, the next step is selecting the ideal location for the AB. The ideal location is centrally located in the nation of operations and approximately 40-60 miles from a major city to eliminate the city environment concealment benefits to the enemy, along with avoiding confrontations and cultural influence on the local populace, but must be close enough to a large city to exploit the logistical support and lines of communication available in the city. Since a robust runway is critical to effective air operations, the standards used for a US bomber base is an ideal AB model. This model AB must have multiple ramps for dispersal of dissimilar missions and at least one large ramp for large-scale air and cargo operations. As discussed, large aircraft use great quantities of fuel and the most efficient way to deliver fuel to these large aircraft is building an efficient hydrant connected fuel system into the tarmac. This efficient hydrant system eliminates the need for a large fuel truck fleet and associated personnel and costs. As planners design 
Conclusion
In an effort to follow the President's new defense strategic guidance to find more efficient and fiscally responsible methods to conduct military operations, planners must consider the many operational and strategic benefits of building a fortified AB in a limited-access nation to conduct combat, ISR and AR operations. The discussion began by outlining the necessary conditions to build this beneficial fortified AB. Once those conditions are met, it was prudent to identify the fiscal and operational benefits from moving ISR and AR operations within the nation where the coalition is conducting combat operations. The operational benefits will save billions of dollars in wasted transit costs, reduce the fatigue on an aging aircraft fleet and an over-stretched aircrew force, and enhance FP operations by mitigating the opportunities for attacks on deployed forces and assets. Additionally, relocating these operations will increase the responsiveness of alert aircraft, eliminating the requirement for wasteful and inefficient airborne fuel reserves. Along with the many operational benefits, the discussion highlighted the multiple strategic benefits of shifting ISR and AR operations to the fortified AB philosophy. Building the right AB in the right location at the right time will enhance BPC efforts with a quality AB and trained FP forces as the security responsibility transitions to a more capable host nation. Additionally, this quality AB will deliver a consistent strategic communication message to the host nation demonstrating the US resolve for the success of the host nation's security. Furthermore, the fortified AB will reduce the diplomatic dependency on overflight and basing rights, and reduce the coalition's operational vulnerability to A2-AD efforts of adversaries. After highlighting the many operational and strategic benefits of the fortified AB philosophy, it was prudent to define the characteristics of that ideal fortified AB. As the Department of Defense must operate in a new fiscally constrained environment and still meet security challenges by conducting combat operations in limited-access nations, this philosophy shift for committing early to building the fortified AB in that limited-access nation becomes increasingly necessary. Senior leadership and strategic planners must commit to this concept as soon as the defined necessary conditions exist to invest the money saved in wasted transit costs to build the fortified AB, infrastructure and FP systems. As the new strategic environment mandates innovative solutions to counter A2-AD efforts, geographic challenges and an increasingly uncertain diplomatic arena, this philosophy shift provides planners a fiscally sound alternative. With the many operational and strategic benefits of this new concept, future strategic planners now have the justification to exploit these benefits to build a fortified airbase in a limited-access nation.
Endnotes
